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FROM ORBIT TO OCEAN
Fixing Southeast Asia’s Remote-Sensing Blind Spots
Gregory B. Poling
 Few regions are as reliant on the marine environment for food security, economic growth, and national security as maritime Southeast Asia. The 
region’s waters constitute some of the most biodiverse marine habitats on the 
planet. The South China Sea accounts for an estimated 12 percent of global fish 
catch and employs as many as half of the fishing vessels in the world.1
But this marine environment is teetering on the brink of environmental ca-
tastrophe. Fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by between 70 
and 95 percent, depending on species, and the story is much the same throughout 
the region.2 Fishers must operate farther afield for longer to fill their holds, often 
racing each other to catch ever-depleting numbers of juvenile fish.
The growing competition for marine resources also worsens interstate friction, 
as fishers are forced to operate farther from shore, often in neighboring exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs), and without permission. Formerly lawful artisanal fish-
ers have become today’s illegal fishing fleets, and coastal communities on disput-
ed waters such as the South China Sea have every incentive to continue to operate 
in contested areas, even in the face of danger from competing law-enforcement 
and paramilitary forces. Most violent incidents in the South China Sea emerge 
from fishing competition, not oil and gas or military activities. That tendency 
only will increase as the marine environment deteriorates and stocks continue 
to shrink. And on top of this increasingly violent competition for fish, Southeast 
Asia’s waters are home to a resurgent threat of piracy and maritime crime; illicit 
trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons, including by terrorist organizations; and 
ever more capable vessels from the Chinese navy, coast guard, and other state 
agencies that increasingly transit, survey, and otherwise operate in neighboring 
states’ waters in a manner not always consistent with international law.
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Yet countries in this region, despite being so reliant on the marine ecosystem 
and so threatened by illegal activities at sea, are largely “sea blind.” Maritime do-
main awareness (MDA)—the ability to detect, identify, and track vessels at sea—
remains underdeveloped throughout Southeast Asia. Naval and law-enforcement 
agencies lack the quantity and quality of platforms needed to enforce laws even 
when they can detect illicit activity. Information sharing both within and among 
countries remains underdeveloped.
The United States has been working to fill capability gaps with material support 
and training through efforts such as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative 
(originally the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative) and the Southeast Asia 
Maritime Law Enforcement 
Initiative. Partners such as Ja-
pan and Australia also provide 
maritime-capacity-building 
assistance in Southeast Asia, 
but the needs remain overwhelming. Even the outside security assistance received 
often focuses on expensive surface and air platforms that cannot possibly close the 
gap—procuring and maintaining enough patrol vessels and aircraft to monitor 
the vast waters of Southeast Asia effectively is a budgetary impossibility for most 
regional states.
Luckily, the last decade has seen the rapid development of cheaper, commer-
cially available remote-sensing technologies that hold the promise of revolution-
izing MDA for developing coastal states. However, Southeast Asian governments 
remain largely unprepared to take advantage of those opportunities. Additionally, 
the United States and other security-assistance providers have been slow to adapt 
to this changing ecosystem; they continue to try to mold the navies and coast 
guards of developing coastal states in the images of their own services, despite 
knowing that such an effort is doomed to fail. But affordable MDA tools exist in 
ever-greater numbers in the private sector, and Washington needs to refocus on 
facilitating access to these technologies and teaching best practices if it wants to 
be part of the solution.
This article opens with an examination of the remote-sensing tools that are or 
soon will be widely available to coastal states and how each will contribute to a rev-
olution in MDA capabilities. It then provides a brief assessment of how well each 
of five Southeast Asian states—Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam—are incorporating available remote-sensing tools, structuring govern-
ment agencies to take advantage of them, and establishing necessary regulations 
for their use. The article concludes with a brief discussion of MDA capacity– 
building efforts in the region by the United States and other states, and how they 
could focus more efficiently on boosting remote-sensing use by partner nations.
Most violent incidents in the South China Sea 
emerge from fishing competition, not oil and 
gas or military activities.
3
Poling: From Orbit to Ocean—Fixing Southeast Asia’s Remote-Sensing Blind
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 P O L I N G  5 9
THE NEAR FUTURE OF REMOTE SENSING
It is 2025, and a notification pops up on a screen in the National Coast Watch 
Center in the Philippines. It provides a snapshot of data on a suspicious vessel 
detected in the Philippine EEZ. Early that morning, a commercial satellite in 
low-earth orbit had detected several very-high-frequency (VHF) radio emissions 
in the area—which was suspicious, since there were no fishing or other vessels 
broadcasting identifying information from that location. An hour later, another 
satellite had collected synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data over the area, which 
showed at least two metal-hulled vessels. A third “bird,” this time collecting 
electro-optical imagery, had passed over a few hours later and the data had just 
come in. This triggered the notification.
The watch officer on duty checks the results. The SAR and optical imagery 
confirm the presence of two large metal vessels, which appear to be refriger-
ated cargo ships called reefers. The latter sensor also shows at least half a dozen 
wooden fishing boats nearby. The system has flagged the incident as probable 
transshipment of catch, which is what the officer expected; satellite detections of 
light sources in the area that month had shown an uptick in night fishing. The 
fishing boats likely are transferring squid and other high-value species bound for 
foreign markets.
Following protocol, the officer transmits a message to the closest Philippine 
Coast Guard station. There are no patrol ships close enough to conduct an inter-
diction at sea, but the service will have a drone overhead in under an hour. It will 
collect identifying information on the vessels to feed into a database accessible by 
law-enforcement officials in any country that is party to the Agreement on Port 
State Measures (known as PSMA)—which means almost everyone. The reefers 
likely will be impounded as soon as they try to off-load their catch. The smaller 
boats will get away, but their illicit network will take a hit, and the coast guard 
will step up patrols in the area.
This scenario is not speculative fiction; it is an example of the cost-effective 
MDA tools that will be available to all countries in the coming years. The shrink-
ing costs of satellite construction and launch are creating a boom in commercial 
low-earth operations. This means that many remote-sensing technologies—such 
as high-resolution satellite imagery and SAR, which previously were available 
only to well-heeled defense and intelligence agencies—are entering the commer-
cial market. Other technologies are emerging for the first time, made possible 
by experimentation in the marketplace, fueled by the much lower entry barriers 
to space. For island nations and developing states, this will be a game changer, 
assuming that they seize the opportunities it presents. It also assumes that the 
partners on whom they rely for capacity-building support, especially the United 
States, will help facilitate access to these technologies.
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/8
 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
A nonexhaustive listing and discussion follow of the various remote-sensing 
technologies that are or soon will be at the core of smart MDA efforts, along with 
some of the major players bringing them to market.
Coastal Radar
Coastal radar has been the most important tool for vessel detection for decades 
and will remain an essential part of any MDA sensing network. But there is wide 
variation in the types and ranges of coastal radar.
For those that can afford it, high-frequency surface-wave radar can detect ves-
sels effectively over two hundred nautical miles from shore. But the kind of afford-
able, generalized radar network that a developing coastal state would seek to oper-
ate generally covers only territorial waters and the contiguous zone, not the EEZ.3
Automatic Identification System
Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders are mandated by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) for all vessels over three hundred tons 
that transit international waters.4 These transponders broadcast identifying infor-
mation about ships, including their IMO and Maritime Mobile Service Identity 
numbers, as well as, to prevent collisions, their heading and speed. IMO-approved 
class A transponders are designed to communicate ship to ship and ship to shore 
within a limited range. A global network of shore-based receivers exists primarily 
to monitor traffic in congested areas, such as ports and busy straits. The first satel-
lite AIS receivers were launched between 2007 and 2010; this allowed detection 
of vessels with sufficiently strong transponders far from shore for the first time.5
AIS is invaluable for monitoring legal activity but has obvious weaknesses. It 
is up to the ship’s captain to input the vessel’s data and ensure the transponder 
is broadcasting, which allows criminals easily to disable or spoof their transmis-
sions. Military and law-enforcement vessels are free to disable their transmissions 
at will. Any ship that is smaller than three hundred tons or only operates domesti-
cally is not required by the IMO to have a transponder. This includes most fishing 
vessels. Many states do require fishing boats to have AIS, but often only a cheaper 
class B transponder, which has an even more limited range, which often means 
that satellites cannot detect them.
Since the first AIS satellite launch, a commercial market has developed, 
driven largely by shipping, oil and gas, and other maritime industries that want 
to keep eyes on their vessels at all times. This market is led by companies such as 
ORBCOMM, exactEarth, and Spire, which supply AIS data to most of the pub-
licly available vessel-monitoring platforms, including MarineTraffic, Windward, 
and Global Fishing Watch. Some of these platforms, such as MarineTraffic, 
combine space-based AIS with a network of shore-based receivers for a more 
complete picture.6
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Most government agencies rely on noncommercial platforms to combine 
commercial AIS with other proprietary sensor data. The most widely used 
is SeaVision, developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation with sup-
port from the U.S. Navy and shared widely among American partners and al-
lies. SeaVision combines unclassified data streams that include terrestrial and 
satellite-based AIS, a limited amount of SAR, and coastal-radar data shared 
by the participating countries. Dozens of partner nations are using SeaVision, 
including most of Southeast Asia.
Vessel Monitoring Systems
Vessel monitoring system (VMS) is a generic term for systems mandated at a na-
tional or subnational level to monitor commercial fishing vessels. VMS transpon-
ders are intended to fill the gap left by AIS. Ideally, all legal fishers operating in a 
coastal state’s EEZ would be required to carry them on board to transmit the ves-
sel’s location and identifying information back to authorities in real time. Many 
commercial manufacturers offer VMSs with a wide range of capabilities and costs, 
but the purpose of all these systems is the same: to provide data that, combined 
with information from AIS, can ensure that all commercial vessels operating le-
gally in a coastal state’s waters can be monitored in real time. VMS, therefore, is a 
necessary component in any effective MDA network; without it, separating licit 
from illicit activity is all but impossible. This is because legal fishing vessels, which 
make up the largest number of boats in an EEZ at any time, cannot be otherwise 
distinguished from nefarious actors, since both are running “dark.”
Electro-optical Imagery
Electro-optical collection systems detect reflected light, including bands beyond 
the visible spectrum, producing panchromatic and multispectral images. This is 
what most users think of when they discuss satellite imagery. Over the last fifteen 
years or so, falling prices for satellite construction and launch have driven down 
the cost of imagery collection, such that a commercial market has developed for 
the first time. There are two broad categories of imagery providers, both of which 
have a role in MDA.
The first group includes suppliers, such as Airbus, Maxar, and ImageSat, 
which have relatively small constellations of large, expensive satellites with long 
lifetimes. They provide the highest-resolution imagery on the market—in some 
cases down to thirty centimeters, which is the legal limit in the United States.7 
They tend to be reliant on large government contracts but increasingly augment 
these with commercial operations.8 Their imagery can provide a high degree of 
detail about a vessel, making them particularly helpful in the identification part 
of MDA. But their relatively small constellations also make their imagery expen-
sive and available only infrequently.
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/8
 6 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The other group of satellite imagery providers is being pioneered by Planet Labs. 
It and those seeking to follow its model are younger than the legacy providers and 
rely on larger constellations of cheaper satellites with shorter lifetimes in low-earth 
orbit. Their maximum resolu-
tions are generally lower, mak-
ing identification of specific 
vessels, or even vessel types, 
difficult, but their larger con-
stellations allow much more 
persistent coverage of an area 
at a lower cost. And as their 
satellites improve they are closing the resolution gap rapidly, suggesting that soon it 
will be possible to get both persistent coverage and very high resolution at low cost.
However, that will not fix the greatest limitation of electro-optical imagery for 
MDA: the weather. Satellites cannot take pictures through cloud cover, and in 
Southeast Asia that can mean long stretches of blindness owing to storms.
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Synthetic aperture radar is radar imagery collected by satellite. It helps mitigate 
the weather problem, being unaffected by cloud cover—a major advantage. But 
it provides other benefits as well. It is very useful for identifying metal vessels at 
sea and can be used to detect environmental hazards such as oil slicks. Vessels 
also are much easier to detect in a SAR image than in an electro-optical one, since 
they present as bright spots on a dark background.
But what SAR gains in detection it loses in identification; it does not provide 
enough detail to distinguish individual vessels, and often not even vessel types. 
It also makes it difficult to detect ships close to each other, such as during trans-
shipment at sea, because they will appear as one large object. And, of course, it 
cannot be used to detect ships with very little metal structure—which includes 
most artisanal fishing boats in places such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
Despite its limitations, SAR increasingly is seen as a vital tool in MDA capa-
bilities because of the ease of vessel detection it provides. It is experiencing the 
same drop in price as electro-optical imagery, although a few years behind. The 
market for SAR is dominated largely by legacy players such as Maxar’s subsidiary 
MDA and an Airbus constellation that includes multiple European SAR satellites. 
Outside the market, major players in the space industry such as China, India, 
Japan, and the United States operate their own SAR satellites.
But some new companies are seeking to disrupt the market in the same way 
that Planet Labs and its ilk are doing for electro-optical imagery. The Finnish 
company ICEYE, the U.S.-based Capella Space and Umbra Lab, and Japan’s 
Synspective all have announced plans for large constellations of low-earth-orbit 
The proliferation of remote-sensing tools 
means that . . . in the next few years the vol-
ume of . . . data will increase many times over. 
. . . Will relevant authorities . . . be able to 
collect it, process it, and compare it with other 
sources to create a robust MDA network?
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satellites that could provide much cheaper, more-persistent coverage at resolu-
tions higher than one meter. ICEYE launched the first such satellite in 2018 and 
followed that with more launches in 2019 and 2020. Capella and Synspective 
made their first launches in late 2020, while Umbra planned to begin launches 
soon.9 Completion of those constellations will have an enormous impact on 
MDA capabilities around the globe.
Low-Light Imaging
Low-light imaging refers to the detection of light sources in the visible spectrum, 
originally developed for meteorological research but more recently applied to 
the MDA field. This is made possible by the visible infrared imaging radiometer 
suite (VIIRS) sensor developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and NASA and launched in 2011. The sensor’s primary 
mission is to detect moonlight reflecting off clouds.10 However, it also is capable 
of detecting the bright lights that many fishing vessels use to attract fish at 
night—an especially popular technique when fishing for squid and other species 
in the waters of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
The Earth Observation Group at NOAA developed algorithms to identify fish-
ing activity, plus a handful of other sources of light such as gas flaring, but not the 
modest light sources that commercial vessels in transit put out. NOAA released 
this VIIRS Boat Detection tool free to the public until late 2019 and the Navy 
began including its data in SeaVision.11 Since then, the Earth Observation Group 
has moved from NOAA to the Colorado School of Mines, where it continues to 
release the VIIRS Boat Detection tool, charging nothing for data with a forty-
five-day delay and a subscription fee for near-real-time data.12
VIIRS has obvious limitations. For instance, it can detect a dark vessel when cor-
related with AIS or VMS, but it cannot provide the details needed to identify it. It is 
unable to disaggregate light sources that are close together, so it cannot tell whether 
a return comes from one boat or a whole fleet. But it provides useful information 
about fishing patterns at large scale. Given the success of the VIIRS Boat Detection 
tool, other players likely will develop new low-light-imaging platforms for MDA.
Radio-Frequency Detection
The term radio-frequency detection refers to satellite-based sensors that can trian-
gulate the location of terrestrial radio-frequency broadcasts, including from ves-
sels at sea. This technology is a new entrant into the remote-sensing market, but 
it has great potential for use in MDA. Early innovators on this front are the U.S.-
based HawkEye 360 and the French company Unseenlabs. HawkEye 360’s grow-
ing constellation of satellites can detect a range of frequencies, including AIS, 
VHF channels 16 and 70 (used for distress signals and safety announcements), 
X-band radar, emergency locator beacons (known as EPIRBs), and L-band radio 
frequencies used for global positioning systems, including China’s BeiDou.13
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These transmissions can be used to detect otherwise dark vessels, because 
even ships that disable or do not carry AIS or VMS transceivers still use marine 
radar, radios, and other transmitting devices. It also can be used to detect inten-
tional spoofing of AIS by determining that a vessel’s broadcasts are not coming 
from where its transponder indicates it is located. A cluster of radio-frequency-
detecting satellites, in a single pass, can triangulate the location of dark vessels 
over a very wide area. This makes it an efficient means of initial detection, which 
can trigger more-targeted remote-sensing tools to follow up and identify suspi-
cious vessels.
Data Processing
The processing of data is just as important as data collection. The proliferation 
of remote-sensing tools means that private individuals and state actors both have 
access to a previously unimaginable amount of data about the maritime domain, 
and in the next few years the volume of those data will increase many times over. 
By the mid-2020s, it will be all but impossible for a vessel of more than a few 
meters in length to operate at sea without detection.
The question is, Will relevant authorities make use of that information ef-
fectively? Will they be able to collect it, process it, and compare it with other 
sources to create a robust MDA network? Part of the challenge will be bureau-
cratic; authorities must make sure that remote-sensing data are getting to the 
right agencies in an efficient manner, not lost in the interagency “food fights” 
endemic to all government bureaucracies. But an equal part of the solution will 
be technological, relying on artificial intelligence and machine learning to collate 
remote-sensing data so that suspicious vessel behavior can be flagged quickly 
enough for law-enforcement agencies, fisheries managers, and others to act on it.
Leading efforts on this front include the work of OceanMind, a nonprofit that 
began in 2014 as a partnership between Satellite Applications Catapult and the 
Pew Charitable Trusts before becoming an independent entity in 2018.14 Ocean-
Mind develops tools to automate vessel detection from remote-sensing sources, 
provide real-time alerts about potential illicit activity, and more. Skylight, a 
branch of late Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen’s Vulcan Inc., is engaged in similar 
efforts. Another promising company in this field is Orbital Insight, although its 
object-detection algorithms are not focused primarily on MDA. All three outfits 
concentrate to one degree or another on using artificial intelligence to automate 
the process of vessel detection in SAR or electro-optical imagery and the subse-
quent correlation of that information with AIS and VMS data.15
Global Fishing Watch, which was launched by Google, Oceana, and SkyTruth 
but is now an independent organization, takes a different approach. It publishes 
fishing vessel AIS data from around the world in real time and invites the public 
to help analyze and identify irregularities—in effect, crowdsourcing the fight 
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against illegal fishing. It also has added VMS transmissions from willing partner 
nations, along with VIIRS data.16 Israel-based Windward has developed its own 
AIS platform, along with numerous algorithms to automate the detection of un-
usual or illicit activity such as transshipments at sea and intentional spoofing or 
disabling of AIS.17
This is just a sampling of leading private-sector efforts to develop remote-sensing 
tools for MDA. Space-based tools and analytic platforms that previously were the 
sole domain of governments are being replicated by nonprofits and commercial 
technology firms, while entirely new technologies are emerging from the private 
sector. Radar and patrol platforms will continue to play critical roles, but the 
foundation of effective MDA has moved to space-based assets. Most coastal states, 
however, remain unaware of or too slow to adapt to these new technologies.
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S REMOTE-SENSING STRUGGLES
Given their long list of maritime-security challenges and considerable MDA gaps, 
Southeast Asian states are underutilizing remote sensing. Thailand has surged 
ahead of the rest of the region in recent years in experimenting with new tech-
nologies and partnering with the private sector, but it still has a lot of work to do. 
Indonesia made some important strides over the last five years, as countering ille-
gal fishing became a major focus of the government, but it has yet to move much 
beyond legacy technologies, and interagency competition severely hampers ef-
fective use of the data it does receive. In Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, 
sea blindness is the rule, not the exception. All three have recognized the need to 
improve MDA and are making modest improvements, but none has an effective 
VMS or adequately incorporates surveillance tools beyond AIS, coastal radar, 
and surface or air patrols.
Only these five states are examined here. They share similar challenges: 
large and difficult-to-monitor EEZs, historical underinvestment in maritime 
capabilities, and constrained government budgets. Neighboring Singapore, by 
comparison, is the most technologically advanced state in the region when it 
comes to MDA capabilities, but with its small EEZ and developed economy it 
does not share many of its neighbors’ constraints in this area, nor does it require 
significant maritime-capacity-building assistance from outside partners such as 
the United States.
Thailand
In April 2015, Thailand’s seafood industry received a “yellow card” from the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), owing to gross violations of international law. Bangkok was 
given a limited time to show improvements or it would suffer a ban on seafood 
exports to the European market. Since then, Thailand has worked to improve its 
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MDA and enforcement practices to comply with international standards, and 
the yellow card was lifted in early 2019.18 The country signed on to the PSMA 
in 2016 as a sign of continued efforts toward combating illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing.19
Thailand explicitly requires VMS devices on all fishing vessels operating in 
its waters. It issued a royal ordinance to this effect in 2015 and immediately fol-
lowed up with guidance from the Department of Fisheries on how VMS instal-
lation would be inspected and enforced.20 Since then the government has issued 
regular amendments clarifying VMS compliance requirements.21 Even with the 
EU yellow card lifted, Thailand continues to take VMS implementation seriously 
as a tool for IUU prevention and enforcement. The Department of Fisheries 
uses both VMS and AIS data to alert the Thai Maritime Enforcement Command 
Center (THAI-MECC) or law-enforcement agencies of any violations occurring 
in their jurisdictions. Like most Southeast Asian states, Thailand is a partner in 
SeaVision and uses it to access terrestrial and satellite AIS alongside its own data, 
including from coastal radars.
The Department of Fisheries has embarked on a landmark partnership with 
OceanMind and the Seafood Task Force, another international nonprofit, to 
improve monitoring and seafood traceability for its fishing fleet. Given Ocean-
Mind’s competencies, this likely includes some analysis of SAR data.22 SeaVi-
sion also provides access to some SAR data, though users have limited ability to 
order collections. This dabbling with SAR is an important step but the tool still 
does not seem to be a routine component of MDA operations by the Department 
of Fisheries or THAI-MECC. The same is true of electro-optical imagery and 
VIIRS. While Thai authorities might be using these for pilot projects, they are 
not used in day-to-day operations. Instead, Thailand remains primarily reliant 
on law-enforcement vessels and patrol aircraft, including unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, to follow up on any suspicious activity that AIS or VMS detects.23
One of Thailand’s most important steps to improve MDA and interagency 
coordination was the strengthening and reorganization of THAI-MECC in 2019. 
Previously the Thai Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center, the renamed 
body has become a leading example for the region of how to empower a single 
government agency to combine information from relevant maritime depart-
ments into a common operating picture.24 It is empowered to handle all national-
level MDA, including for both law-enforcement agencies and the armed forces. 
The Royal Thai Navy, the Marine Department, and the Department of Fisheries 
all are required to feed AIS, VMS, and other forms of information to THAI-
MECC, which collates it and shares information about violations with enforce-
ment agencies. THAI-MECC is now Thailand’s national single point of contact 
to coordinate with partner nations on maritime-security issues and is expected 
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to develop into a robust maritime fusion center to collect, process, and distribute 
remote-sensing data.
Indonesia
Shortly after his election in 2014, Indonesia’s president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo 
appointed businesswoman Susi Pudjiastuti as minister of maritime affairs and 
fisheries. For the next five years, Minister Susi led an effort to halt rampant IUU 
fishing and protect local fish stocks, and thereby to safeguard the archipelago’s 
marine economy. In 2014, she convinced Jokowi to declare a one-year morato-
rium on all foreign fishing in Indonesian waters; later that year, she launched her 
trademark policy of sinking foreign vessels caught fishing illegally.25
Indonesia first mandated the use of VMS devices by “any person performing 
business and/or activities on fishery management” in 2009.26 In 2015, Susi’s office 
finally issued Regulation No. 42, which provided guidelines on VMS implemen-
tation. The regulation set up a fisheries-vessel-monitoring center and assigned 
a director general in the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries to standardize 
VMS operating procedures for all vessels and manage inspections and installation 
of transponders via a team of fisheries supervisors. This director general was tasked 
with handling all VMS data and conferring with counterparts across ministries to 
sanction violators. The regulation also set out stringent requirements for potential 
VMS vendors. All Indonesian 
fishing vessels over thirty tons 
now must have a VMS device 
installed, which they are re-
quired to keep on at all times 
while fishing, along with a certificate proving that the vessel’s data can be transmit-
ted successfully to the fisheries-vessel-monitoring center.27 In June 2017, Indonesia 
became the first country in the world to share its national VMS data publicly, allow-
ing the information to be published on Global Fishing Watch’s online platform.28
Like many counterparts in Southeast Asia, Indonesian maritime agencies 
rely on SeaVision to gather AIS data and collate them with other tools, includ-
ing coastal radar. Like their Thai counterparts, Indonesian law-enforcement 
and fisheries-management agencies are using electro-optical imagery, SAR, and 
VIIRS in small-scale research projects, but these technologies do not seem to 
be part of day-to-day MDA operations. Instead, Jakarta continues to rely on an 
insufficient number of air- and surface-patrol assets to augment the country’s 
AIS and VMS capabilities. This means that Indonesian maritime agencies, which 
are less well funded, less capable, and less coordinated than those in Thailand, 
are stuck in a hopeless game of Whac-A-Mole. They disrupt a small percentage 
of the illicit activity in one of the world’s largest EEZs, but most of the bad actors 
continue to operate undetected.
By the mid-2020s, it will be all but impos-
sible for a vessel of more than a few meters in 
length to operate at sea without detection.
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Interagency rivalry compounds these problems. The Indonesian Maritime 
Security Agency, or BAKAMLA, often is referred to as Indonesia’s coast guard, 
but it does not have the resources or the sole mandate to fulfill such a charge. 
BAKAMLA was formed in December 2014 to coordinate law-enforcement ca-
pabilities across all agencies, as well as to conduct its own operations.29 It techni-
cally has a mandate to collect all maritime intelligence and information from and 
disseminate these to other relevant law-enforcement bodies, which would include 
remote-sensing data. But it has no authority over counterparts such as the navy 
or the water police, which means that in practice it cannot demand information 
from them. The navy in particular has strong bureaucratic incentives to hoard 
information and create its own separate operating picture.30 The situation grew 
more complicated in 2015 when Jokowi set up a presidential task force to combat 
illegal fishing, to coordinate efforts among ministries.31 In practice, the task force 
did not function as it was meant to because of bureaucratic “stovepiping” and a 
mismatch in priorities with the other agencies, which are not as focused on ille-
gal fishing. The task force was disbanded in 2019 and a new Indonesia Maritime 
Information Center was launched in July 2020 to strengthen interagency coordi-
nation. The center is promising but remains untested.
Further improvements in MDA will require better interagency coordination, 
which is unlikely unless BAKAMLA is given the funding and mandate to serve 
as a national maritime single point of contact like THAI-MECC. Steps are be-
ing taken to establish a maritime information fusion center within BAKAMLA, 
which would be a welcome advance, but such a center will succeed only if other 
agencies and the armed forces are compelled to share more data.32
Jakarta took another important step with the recent announcement that 
BAKAMLA would be placed in charge of overall maritime security in the “North 
Natuna Sea”—that area of the South China Sea that falls within Indonesia’s EEZ.33 
But it remains to be seen how well that order will be implemented and how much 
authority BAKAMLA will exercise over other agencies in practice.
Malaysia
Malaysia faces the same maritime-security challenges as Indonesia and Thailand, 
including illegal fishing, trafficking, piracy, and external security threats, espe-
cially in the South China Sea. However, maritime security and MDA capabili-
ties have not received nearly the same high-level attention from the Malaysian 
government. Interagency rivalry, especially between the Royal Malaysian Navy 
and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), prevents effective 
information sharing and muddies the waters when it comes to determining 
jurisdiction. It took high-level political intervention in Thailand and Indo-
nesia to prioritize greater transparency and information sharing as necessary 
components for improved MDA; in the absence of such leadership, Malaysia’s 
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maritime-security agencies continue the bureaucratic default behavior of hoard-
ing privileged information and seeing transparency more as a threat of embar-
rassment than as an opportunity to improve performance.
Malaysia’s use of remote-sensing tools for MDA is modest and hampered by 
unclear legal requirements, a lack of regulatory follow-through, and unequal 
access to information for responsible agencies. The Fisheries Department is 
charged with VMS implementation, but the system covers only large vessels, both 
Malaysian and foreign, operating far from shore. The regulation and implemen-
tation of the system are less clear than in neighboring Indonesia and Thailand. 
The 2013 National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing 
specifies that every fishing vessel over seventy tons, as a requirement for renew-
ing a fishing license, must carry a mobile transceiver unit that reports the ship’s 
location to the Fisheries Department’s VMS system.34 That document claims that 
Malaysia has been using satellite-based VMS since 1999, but if so it was only on 
a small scale; the requirement for vessels over seventy tons to be covered by VMS 
did not begin until 2006.35 Senior officials have indicated that implementation 
and enforcement were not strict until around 2014.36 Regardless, the system cov-
ers only a small percentage of total fishing activity in Malaysian waters. The 2013 
national plan claimed that VMS requirements would be expanded to other types 
of vessels, but that does not appear to be happening.37
The Royal Malaysian Navy and MMEA use AIS to monitor commercial traf-
fic in the country’s waters, but not in an efficient or collaborative manner. Both 
have access to shore-based AIS receivers.38 But while the Royal Malaysian Navy 
uses SeaVision to integrate this information with satellite-based AIS and other 
data streams, it has no obligation or incentive to share these additional data with 
MMEA or other agencies. The navy devolves remote-sensing information gather-
ing to local commands, which make an assessment before sending enforcement 
vessels to investigate suspicious activity. No Malaysian agency seems to be using 
other remote-sensing tools, whether electro-optical imagery, SAR, or VIIRS, as 
part of normal MDA operations, though they have access to limited amounts of 
each through SeaVision.
There is no maritime single point of contact or fusion center in Malaysia, save 
for one that the armed forces operate at Tawau, which only monitors security 
threats off the east coast of Sabah. MMEA is the obvious candidate to fill this 
role. It was established in 2004 and explicitly was empowered to carry out coastal 
surveillance and “enforce law and order under any federal law.”39 The agency has 
plans to establish its own fusion center, but bureaucratic hurdles prevent it from 
playing a robust interagency coordinating role. Its legal authority to mandate 
cooperation from other agencies is vague—purposefully. Meanwhile, Malaysia 
operates multiple competing interagency groups and ad hoc committees with 
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authority over maritime surveillance, including the National Security Council, 
the Maritime Information Exchange Centre, and the Action Committee on 
Maritime Operation. The National Security Council has a National Surveillance 
and Operation Centre to coordinate intelligence and information sharing, but it 
is focused on traditional national-security threats, not MDA.
Philippines
The Philippines is likely the most sea blind of the countries examined in this 
article. It combines limited remote-sensing and patrol capabilities with a larger 
and more challenging maritime geography than most other states. Manila’s in-
ability to monitor its vast EEZ effectively has been on display for years, especially 
in contested areas of the South China Sea. But it also has difficulty keeping an 
eye on its archipelagic waters and territorial sea. That is why President Rodrigo 
Duterte recently demanded that all foreign vessels seek permission before tran-
siting Philippine waters.40 The order violates international law and Philippine 
authorities have no capability to enforce it. It also shows how sea blindness leads 
to bad policy making by robbing authorities of necessary information and casting 
the maritime commons as a source of unknown threat rather than shared op-
portunity. The silver lining for the Philippines is that it recognizes its own MDA 
shortcomings more than many of its neighbors, is undertaking some needed 
regulatory and bureaucratic fixes, and enjoys considerable outside capacity-
building support—especially from the United States.
The Philippines is the only country examined in this article that has no VMS 
system in place. The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) laid out 
plans for a nationwide VMS system covering licensed fishing vessels in the EEZ 
and high seas in 2012, but they were never implemented.41 The bureau issued 
new regulations mandating VMS in 2018, but there has been little movement so 
far. The regulation called for all vessels over fifty tons to be equipped with VMS 
within one year—a deadline already missed—with those between thirty and fifty 
tons to follow within two years.42 BFAR has stated that installing VMS on more 
than five thousand vessels is an important component of its Integrated Marine 
Environment Monitoring Phase II program, which seeks to create a fisheries-
monitoring center in line with recommendations that different regional fisheries-
management organizations have made.43
The Philippine Navy, BFAR, and component agencies of the National Coast 
Watch System make regular use of both terrestrial and satellite-based AIS 
through SeaVision.44 However, SeaVision and other platforms are not used 
uniformly across all agencies. Beyond AIS, the Philippines does not seem to be 
using any remote-sensing technologies in normal MDA operations, although it 
could be experimenting with SAR and electro-optical satellite imagery. Philip-
pine academics and nongovernmental organizations have begun using VIIRS 
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to study fishing patterns, which might raise the technology’s profile in official 
government circles.45
The Philippines established the National Coast Watch System in 2011, with 
support from the U.S. government. It is intended to be the primary inter-
agency coordinating mechanism for maritime security and MDA. It consists 
of the National Coast Watch Council, established via executive order in 2012 
to coordinate maritime policy, and the National Coast Watch Center, which 
serves as a maritime fusion center to collect and distribute data to relevant 
agencies. It is run predominantly by the Philippine Coast Guard but is sup-
ported by ten different agencies—with sometimes conflicting mandates and 
little desire to share data. These include the Philippine Navy, the national 
police, BFAR, and the drug-enforcement agency.46 It also is unclear how the 
National Coast Watch Cen-
ter, which is tasked with 24/7 
monitoring of the maritime 
domain through the various 
components of the National 
Coast Watch System, will in-
tegrate—or compete—with 
BFAR’s planned Fisheries 
and Marine Environment 
Center, with its fifteen regional monitoring centers across the Philippines. 
The former will not be able to establish an effective MDA system without ac-
cess to the latter’s VMS data.
Vietnam
Since receiving a yellow card of its own from the EU in October 2017, Vietnam 
has taken a raft of steps to crack down on its fishers’ illegal activities and to moni-
tor its waters better. Part of this effort has involved some uneven implementation 
of new remote-sensing plans, mostly at the provincial level. While Hanoi has 
made considerable progress on the regulatory front, actual MDA capabilities 
remain lacking. Following the issuance of the yellow card, Vietnam passed a new 
law on fisheries in November 2017 and in 2018 released a national plan of action 
to deter illegal fishing.47 Hanoi formed the National Steering Committee on IUU 
Fishing Prevention in May 2019 to coordinate its efforts better—likely with an 
eye toward the European Union’s review of its progress in November. That com-
mittee reports directly to the prime minister.48 The Europeans decided not to lift 
the yellow card at that time but praised the steps Hanoi had taken.49
Vietnam’s 2017 law on fisheries mandates that all commercial fishing vessels 
over fifteen meters be equipped with VMS. At the time of the law’s passage, only 
three thousand Vietnamese fishing boats had such systems, under a program 
Saving dwindling fish stocks, dismantling 
trafficking networks, preventing the spread of 
Islamic State–linked terror cells, countering 
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea—
meeting these . . . challenges is impossible 
without much better ability to detect, identify, 
and track vessels at sea.
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called MOVIMAR. That effort was funded by France’s development agency and 
makes use of French space agency satellites, primarily to track ocean conditions 
and issue storm warnings to the vessels, not to monitor their fishing activity.50 The 
2018 national plan of action called on the Directorate of Fisheries and individual 
provincial governments to make better use of MOVIMAR to detect and deter il-
legal fishing. As a result, plans are under way to install the systems on all fishing 
vessels, starting with those at least twenty-four meters in length, then expanding 
to all those of at least fifteen meters. But the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, which oversees the Directorate of Fisheries and wrote the plan of 
action, is leaving implementation to provincial authorities, resulting in uneven 
progress. The EU cited slow installation of VMS transceivers as a reason for not 
lifting the yellow card.51
Aside from VMS, Vietnam’s remote-sensing capabilities are extremely un-
derdeveloped. The Vietnamese navy, coast guard, and Fisheries Surveillance 
(a branch of the Fisheries Directorate) are the primary actors in the maritime-
security and MDA space. But there is no evidence that any of them make regular 
use of remote-sensing technologies, aside from coastal radar and terrestrial AIS. 
Vietnam has a robust network of shore-based AIS stations and recently was added 
as a SeaVision participating country. But it shares only a fraction of its terrestrial 
data and does not appear to use the platform in day-to-day MDA operations. It 
seems likely that a small number of Vietnamese users are testing out the platform, 
so relevant agencies could adopt it more broadly in the future.52
The Vietnam National Space Center (VNSC), under the Academy of Science 
and Technology, is responsible for obtaining and sharing space-based remote-
sensing data. But its focus is mostly on developing national space capabilities, not 
collecting and analyzing remote-sensing data from commercial and partner-nation 
sources. For instance, the center plans to launch Vietnam’s first national SAR satel-
lite in 2023.53 But with hundreds of low-cost commercial SAR satellites going up in 
the next three years, this at best will duplicate, and in many ways fall short of, capa-
bilities available on the commercial market. The VNSC also has no clear authority 
to request VMS data from the Directorate of Fisheries. Nonetheless, the center 
would constitute the most sensible choice for a future maritime fusion center—if it 
were given more power to coordinate among relevant agencies and if it refocused 
its mission on efficiently boosting MDA capabilities using all available sources.
Vietnam also lacks a maritime single point of contact to coordinate efforts 
and work with partners. Each province operates its own regulatory bodies with 
only general guidance from national agencies, and there is limited coordination 
among relevant national-level actors. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development is responsible for combating IUU fishing through the Vietnam 
Fisheries Resources Surveillance; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National 
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Border Commission is the principal agency for the National Steering Commit-
tee on the East Sea and Islands; and the Ministry of National Defense oversees 
the navy and coast guard and maintains its own operating picture at sea. None 
of these has clear authority to coordinate information sharing in the name of 
greater national MDA.
There is no greater security need in Southeast Asia than improved MDA. Saving 
dwindling fish stocks, dismantling trafficking networks, preventing the spread 
of Islamic State–linked terror cells, countering Chinese aggression in the South 
China Sea—meeting these and many other challenges is impossible without 
much better ability to detect, identify, and track vessels at sea. Yet regional states 
historically have underinvested in patrol and sensing capabilities in both naval 
and law-enforcement agencies. They also have proved very resistant to informa-
tion sharing, both within and among countries. This is changing slowly, in places 
such as the Sulu Sea and the Strait of Malacca, but much more work is needed.
Improving MDA in Southeast Asia also is critical to the national-security 
interests of the United States and other outside parties. The South China Sea is a 
primary theater of U.S.-China competition, and the inability of other claimants 
to monitor Beijing’s activities effectively is one of the foremost challenges in these 
waters. Poor MDA makes Southeast Asia a continuing hot spot for trafficking, 
piracy and maritime crime, and transnational terrorism. And rapidly depleting 
fish stocks threaten the livelihoods of tens of thousands, the food security of mil-
lions, and potentially the stability of governments in this critical region.
The U.S. government and its partner governments recognize the challenge, as 
reflected in the unprecedented amount of security assistance directed at maritime 
capacity building in Southeast Asia. But Washington still is focused too much on 
high-end maritime-security cooperation at the expense of nuts-and-bolts MDA 
capabilities. It tends to focus on naval operations rather than law enforcement, 
because most engagements take place between the Pacific Fleet and partner na-
vies. Even when law enforcement is the focus, the United States and like-minded 
security partners most often focus on replicating their own best practices in 
conducting MDA operations. The same goes for the sensing and patrol platforms 
that they transfer to regional states. But trying to implement twentieth-century 
MDA solutions that work for developed states is not going to be cost-effective for 
developing coastal nations in the twenty-first century. Coast guard cutters and 
manned patrol aircraft are important, but they also are expensive to obtain, op-
erate, and maintain, which means that Southeast Asian partners never will have 
enough to monitor their vast waters effectively.
Luckily, MDA in the coming decades will be dominated by cheaper, more-
efficient remote-sensing tools. The United States, Australia, Japan, and others 
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should not abandon high-end maritime-security assistance, but they should 
shift more of their efforts toward introducing partners to the booming market 
in remote sensing. This will require recognizing that the days of relying on 
government agencies—or large government contractors—to develop and de-
ploy most MDA technologies are ending quickly. The U.S. government should 
not try to re-create the remote-sensing technologies and platforms emerging 
in the private sectors just so it can provide its own version to partner nations; 
instead it should help introduce partners to the diverse offerings of the mar-
ket. It should provide more assistance in processing the vast quantities of data 
that result. And it should advise partners on regulatory and bureaucratic best 
practices to use those data effectively in naval and law-enforcement operations. 
The future of MDA is increasingly clear; the United States and its partners in 
Southeast Asia should embrace it.
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